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1  Overview 
This  paper  provides  a very  nice  expository  framework  to  study  and  an 
alyze  the  literature  on  financial  market  imperfections  and  aggregate 
economic  activity.  In particular,  the paper  works  through  a  sequence  of 
models  with  interesting  applications  that  nicely  capture  the  following 
key  ideas: 
1. Agency/enforcement  problems  imply  that  borrowers  must  pay  a 
premium  for  external  finance. 
2.  In general,  this  premium  depends  on: 
(a)  Borrower  balance  sheet  positions  (i.e.,  financial  structure  mat 
ters!)  and 
(b)  Institutions  (i.e., monitoring  and  enforcement  capabilities). 
3.  Given  points  1 and  2,  feedback  can  arise  between  the  financial  and 
real  sectors,  with  implications  for  allocations  and  dynamics. 
The  various  applications  illustrate  how  financial  factors  might  influ 
ence  business  cycles,  growth,  inequality,  and  international  capital  flows. 
While  this  paper  primarily  summarizes  where  the  literature  has  been, 
I  would  like  to  focus  my  comments  on where  I think  it should  be  head 
ing.  At  this  juncture  I  think  there  are  two  key  issues.  First,  to  assess 
which  of  the  qualitative  predictions  of  these  models  can  be  taken  seri 
ously,  it  is ultimately  necessary  to  evaluate  them  against  the  data.  The 
simple  overlapping  generations  structure,  while  very  useful  for qualita 
tive  analysis,  it  is not  well  suited  for  doing  a  quantitative  evaluation. 
Second,  it  is also  important  to understand  whether  restrictions  on  the 
contracting  structure  may  be  sweeping  important  considerations  under 62 Gertler 
the  rug.  This  paper,  as well  as many  in  the  literature,  restricts  attention 
to  static  one  period  contracts  in  the  form  of noncontingent  debt.  There  is 
a  strong  payoff  in  terms  of  tractability  from  going  this  route  and  a com 
pelling  justification  from  the  standpoint  of  realism.  At  the  same  time, 
one  has  to wonder  whether  permitting  a  richer  contracting  structure 
might  mitigate  the  incentive  problems  in a way  that  significantly  alters 
the predictions.  To be  sure,  often  we  do  not  see  these  richer  structures  in 
practice,  but  that begs  the  question  of why  we  do  not. 
In  my  discussion  I  will  address  these  two  issues  by  sketching  an  ex 
tension  of Matsuyama's  model  that:  (a)  moves  toward  being  suitable  for 
quantitative  analysis;  and  (b) allows  for  a  richer  contract  structure.  Fur 
ther,  the model  retains  the  virtue  of  tractability  that  is present  in his  ex 
amples.  In particular,  it  is possible  to  solve  the  steady  state  by  hand.  At 
the  same  time,  it is possible  to employ  this  framework  for  simple  quan 
titative  analysis.  In particular,  I  will  present  a  simple  numerical  experi 
ment  that  analyzes  the  link  between  financial  structure  and  develop 
ment. 
Before  proceeding,  I  note  that  there  is now  a  literature  underway  that 
is developing  quantitative  frameworks  for  the  analysis  of  credit  market 
frictions.  Examples  include  Bernanke,  Gertler,  and  Gilchrist  (1999),  Carl 
strom  and  Fuerst  (1997),  Christiano,  Motto,  and  Rostagno  (2006),  Beura 
and  Shinn  (2007),  Greenwood,  Sanchez,  and Wang  (2007),  and  Quadrini 
and  Jermann  (2007).  The  example  I develop  builds  directly  off  of Mat 
suyama's  model  but  also  captures  the  spirit  of  these  other  frameworks. 
2  A Model  of  Financial  Frictions  with  Infinitely  Lived  Agents 
The  model  has  the  following  features.  The  frictionless  benchmark  is a 
standard  neoclassical  growth  model.  Suppose  that  there  is a representa 
tive  family  with  a  continuum  of members  of measure  unity  that  share 
consumption  equally.  Each  period  a  fraction  1  - 
/  family  members 
supply  one  unit  of  labor  inelastically  in a perfectly  competitive  market. 
In  addition,  each  period  a  fraction  /  are  entrepreneurs  that  manage 
firms.  Entrepreneurs  acquire  capital  each  period  and  hire  labor  in order 
to produce  output  using  a  standard  Cobb-Douglas  technology.  Capital 
is perfectly  mobile  but  the process  of  financing  it is  imperfect,  as we  dis 
cuss  shortly. 
In  addition,  I assume  there  is  random  turnover  between  entrepre 
neurs  and  workers:  in any  period  t an  entrepreneur  has  a probability  0 
of  surviving  until  the next  period,  which  means  that  (1 
- 
6)/exit  at  t +  1. Comment  63 
Entrepreneurs  that  exit  at  t +  1 pay  out  any  retained  earnings  to  their  re 
spective  families  and  immediately  resume  their  careers  as workers.  At 
the  same  time, with  probability  (1 
- 
6)//(l  -/),  a  worker  at  t  becomes  an 
entrepreneur  at  t +  1. This  implies  that  there  is a  total  of  (1 
- 
0)/of  new 
entrepreneurs  at  t +  1,  exactly  offsetting  the  number  that  exit.  In addi 
tion,  the  family  gives  each  new  entrepreneurs  a  start-up  transfer  of  d 
(in  units  of  consumption).  As  will  become  clear  shortly,  I  introduce 
turnover  as  a device  to ensure  that  entrepreneurs  do  not  indefinitely  re 
tain  earnings  to  save  their way  out  of  the  financial  constraint. 
To motivate  a  friction  in  the  capital  market,  we  assume?following 
Matsuyama?that  there  is  a  costly  enforcement  problem:  Only  a  frac 
tion  X of  the  firm's  gross  return  is pledgeable.  Because  the borrower's  fu 
ture  earnings  affect  current  incentives,  however,  the  financial  contract 
depends  on  intertemporal  considerations.  At  the  same  time,  however, 
the  framework  nests  Matsuyama's  static  contracting  problem. 
Let  kt denote  the  firm's  capital  stock,  Rt+1  the  firm's  return  to  capital 
from  ttot  +  l,rt+i  the  frictionless  borrowing  rate  (equal  to  the household 
return  on  saving),  |J  the households'  subjective  discount  factor,  and  AtA+i 
the  ratio  of  the  household's  marginal  utility  of  consumption  at  t +  1 to 
consumption  at  t.  We  can  then  express  the  value  Vtoi  an  entrepreneur's 
firm  as  follows: 
Vt 
= max 
X  (QW\t+i(Rt+1+i 
- 
rt+i+l)kt+i  (1) 
= 
max[(R, 
- 
rt)kt +  6p\{+1] 
The  entrepreneur  takes  Rt+1+i  and  rt+i+i  as 
given.  (Given  constant  returns 
to  scale  and  perfectly  mobile  capital,  Rt+1+i  is  independent  of  the  firm's 
size). 
Intuitively,  the  entrepreneur  maximizes  the discounted  value  of  earn 
ings  that he  or  she will  eventually  pay  out  to  the  family.  For  this  reason, 
earnings  each  period  t +  i are weighted  by  the probability  of  survival  9*. 
Note  also  that with  frictionless  capital  markets,  Rt+1 
= 
rt+v  In  this  in 
stance,  competitive  pressures  ensure  that  in  equilibrium,  the  return  of 
capital  equals  the  frictionless  borrowing  rate. With  capital  market  fric 
tions,  however,  agency/enforcement  problems  add  to  the  effective  cost 
of  external  finance,  driving  a  wedge  between  Rt+1 and  rt+1.  Bernanke  and 
Gertler  (1989)  term  this  difference,  Rt+1 
- 
rt+1, as  the  premium  for  exter 
nal  finance.  Generally  speaking,  this  premium  may  be  thought  of  as  the 
measure  of  the  degree  of  financial  market  frictions. 
At  the  end  of  t  -1,  the  firm  decides  its capital  stock  for  t. It finances  this 64 Gertler 
capital  partly  by  issuing  bonds,  bt,  and  partly  through  retained  earn 
ings,^. 
*, 
= 
&,  +  wt  (2) 
Net  worth,  in  turn,  depends  on  the  gross  return  to  capital  net  the  obli 
gations  to bondholders.  It thus  evolves  as  follows: 
wm 
= 
Rt+iK 
- 
n+A (3) 
= 
Rt+1kt 
- 
rt+1(kt 
- 
wt) 
= 
(Rt+1 
~ 
rt+1)kt 
+  rt+1wt 
As  noted  earlier,  we  motivate  the  financial  friction  by  assuming  a 
costly  enforcement  problem  that  is a  simple  multiperiod  generalization 
of  the  static  problem  in  Matsuyama.  In particular,  the  entrepreneur  has 
the  option  of walking  away  with  the  fraction  (1 
- 
X) assets  (and  giving 
them  to his  family).  The  cost  is that he  or  she  forfeits  the discounted  pro 
ceeds  from  operating  the  firm,  Vt, as well  as his  or her  equity  stake,  rt+1wr 
For  lenders  willing  to  supply  funds  to  the  borrower,  the  following  in 
centive  constraint  must  be  satisfied: 
rt+1wt  +  Vt^(l-\)Rt+1kt 
or  equivalently, 
rt+1wt  +  (Rt+1 
- 
rt+1)kt  +  pe^+1  i=  (1 
~ 
X)Rt+1kr  (4) 
If the  incentive  constraint  is binding  in equilibrium, 
rt+1 
- 
AKm 
As  in  Matsuyama,  for  the  incentive  constraint  to bind  it  must  be  the  case 
that  rt+1  > XRt+1: otherwise  the  firm  can  pledge  sufficient  assets  to elimi 
nate  any  incentive  to  renege  on  borrowers. 
As  in Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989),  Matsuyama,  and  elsewhere,  the 
capital  market  friction  makes  the  firm's  demand  for  capital  depend  on 
entrepreneurial  net worth.  The  difference  here  from  the  earlier  literature 
is  that  the  concept  of  net  worth  depends  not  only  on  end-of-period  re 
tained  earnings,  rt+1wt +  (Rt+1 
- 
rt+1)kt/ but  also  the  firm's  discounted  fu 
ture  earnings  P0V^+1. This  extra  component  of  net  worth  enters  due  to 
the multiperiod  nature  of  the  problem:  lenders  recognize  that  the  bor 
rower's  incentives  depend  not  only  on  current  liquid  assets  but  also  on Comment  65 
his  or  her  prospective  net  earnings.  Note  that  as  9 goes  to  zero,  the  in 
centive  constraint  reduces  to  exactly  the  one  in Matsuyama's  static 
framework.  In  this  instance,  firms  only  operate  for one  period  (since  9  is 
zero  they  exit  immediately  in  the  subsequent  period),  and  hence  only 
current  liquid  assets  affect  the  demand  for  capital. 
Though  the  complete  model  is very  easy  to analyze  and  solve  numer 
ically,  in what  follows  I restrict  attention  to  the  steady  state,  which  can 
be  solved  by  hand.  In particular,  in  the  steady  state  both  Rt+1 and  rt+1  are 
fixed.  Given  this  restriction,  it is possible  to  find  the  following  reduced 
form  expression  for  the  firm's  demand  for  capital: 
kt 
= 
?rwt  (6) 
where  c()  >  1 and  solves 
y^rtt 
- 
W(R 
~ 
r)?  +  (W? 
- 
r)4>  +  1 =  0. 
Given  asset  returns,  the  demand  for  capital  at  the  firm  level  is propor 
tionate  to  the  firm's  stock  of  liquid  assets.  Observe  that  in  the  steady 
state  liquid  assets  and  capital  will  be  evolving  at  the  individual  firm 
level  but  constant  in  the  steady  state,  due  to  the death-and-birth  process 
of  firms.  It  is  accordingly  straightforward  to  aggregate  the  individual 
demands  for  capital  to obtain  the  following  steady  state  relation: 
JC  = 
4>rW 
where  K  = 
jf0k(i)tdi is  the  steady  state  aggregate  capital  stock  and  W  = 
jf0w(i)tdi  is  the  steady  aggregate  stock  of  firms'  liquid  assets. 
Note  next  that  aggregating  across  entrepreneurs  yields  the  following 
equation  of motion  for  aggregate  liquid  assets: 
,/  ,/  J 
J  w(i)t+1di 
=  9[(R 
- 
r) J k(i)tdi  4- r  J  w(i)tdi] +  (1 
- 
Q)fd 
Jo Jo  Jo 
where  the  first  term  on  the  right  is  the  total  assets  of  entrepreneurs  that 
survive  between  t and  r  +  1 and  the  second  is that  of new  entrants.  Given 
that  aggregate  entrepreneurial  assets  and  aggregate  capital  are  fixed  in 
steady  state, we  may  express  this  relation  as 
W  = 
9[(R 
- 
r)K  +  rW] +  (1 
- 
9)D 
withD=/d. 
We  can  now  compactly  characterize  the  steady  state  equilibrium  and, 
in doing  so,  highlight  the  joint  interaction  between  real  and  financial 66 Gertler 
conditions.  Let  a  denote  the  capital  share  coefficient  in  the  Cobb 
Douglas  production  function,  A  a common  productivity  factor,  8  the de 
preciation  rate,  and N  =  1 -/total  labor, which  as we  noted  earlier  is  in 
inelastic  supply.  Then  the  steady  system  determines  K, R,  r, and W  as  fol 
lows: 
y  (k V-i  R  =  a?  +  1 -  8 =  aA  ?  +1-8  (7) 
Pr 
=  1  (8) 
K =  4>(R,r)W  (9) 
w=i-e[(K-^  + i]D 
(10) 
Observe  first  that  in  the  benchmark  model  with  frictionless  capital 
markets,  the wealth  constraint  on  capital  no  longer  applies.  Firms  adjust 
the  demand  for  capital  until  the marginal  return  to  capital  equals  the 
household  return  on  saving: 
R  =  r  (11) 
Given  this  condition  and  steady  state  consumption  Euler  condition  (8), 
the  return  to  capital  R  equals  the  inverse  of  the  subjective  discount  fac 
tor.  In  turn,  K  adjusts  to ensure  that  the gross  marginal  product  of  capi 
tal equals  (3_1.  Thus,  just  as  in  the  frictionless  neoclassical  model,  K  is de 
termined  independently  of  financial  factors. 
The  frictionless  allocation,  however,  is not  feasible  if the  enforcement 
constraint  is binding.  In this  instance,  equations  (9) and  (10) determine  K. 
As  in the  literature  that Matsuyama  surveys,  K  is proportionate  to  the  in 
ternal  equity  in  the  entrepreneurial  sector,  W.  In general,  when  this  bal 
ance  sheet  constraint  is binding,  K  lies  below  its value  in  the  frictionless 
equilibrium  and,  in correspondence,  R  lies  above  its  frictionless  counter 
part.  Put  differently,  the  financial  market  friction  gives  rise  to a positive 
relation  between  aggregate  real  activity  and  balance  sheet  strength.  This 
is also manifested  in an  inverse  relation  between  the premium  for  exter 
nal  finance,  measured  by  R - 
r, an  aggregate  economic  activity.  This  kind 
of  behavior  underlies  most  of  the  applications  in  Matsuyama's  paper's 
feature.  The main  difference  here  is I jettison  the overlapping  generations 
setup  and  instead  employ  a  framework  that  is a variation  of  the  conven 
tional  infinite  horizon/representative  agent  framework  that  is  com 
monly  used  for quantitative  analysis  in  macroeconomics. Comment  67 
3  A  Simple  Numerical  Experiment 
The  virtue  of  the  general  approach,  accordingly,  is  that  one  can  get  a 
sense  of  potential  empirical  relevance.  I illustrate  this with  an  example 
based  on Greenwood,  Sanchez,  and Wang  (2007).  These  authors  present 
evidence  of  a positive  relation  between  various  measures  of  financial  de 
velopment  and  capital  and  output  per  capita.  They  proceed  to develop 
a  theoretical  model  of  finance  and  development  and  then  perform  a cal 
ibration  exercise  to assess  how  well  the model  can  characterize  the  facts. 
The  model  I present  here  is  much  simpler  than  theirs,  but  it  is nonethe 
less  sufficiently  rich  to permit  a  similar  kind  of  exercise  for  illustrative 
purposes. 
In particular,  I present  two  different  calibrations  of  the model.  The 
first  is  a benchmark  calibration  meant  to  represent  an  economy  with 
highly  developed  financial  markets,  such  as  the United  States.  The  sec 
ond  calibration,  in  turn,  is  meant  to  capture  an  emerging-market  econ 
omy  that has  relatively  less-developed  financial  markets.  I then  explore 
the  implications  for  capital  intensity  across  the  two  countries.  I should 
stress  that  this  example  is  meant  for  illustrative  purposes  only. 
I assume  the  real  (i.e.,  nonfinancial)  parameters  are  the  same  for both 
countries.  Given  the period  length  is one  year,  I set  p 
=  0.96  and  8 =  0.1. 
I also  set a  =  0.33.  All  these  values  are  standard.  I allow  the parameters 
that  govern  the  financial  market  friction,  X, 9,  and  D,  to vary  across  the 
two  countries.  For  the United  States,  I fix  these  variable  to  target  a 2 per 
cent  external  finance  premium  (based  on  evidence  on  the  spread  be 
tween  the prime  lending  rate  and  the  riskless  rate),  a debt-equity  ratio  of 
roughly  unity  (again  roughly  in  line with  the historical  data)  and  also  a 
firm  survival  rate  to  roughly  match  the  evidence.  This  leads  me  to 
choose  X = 
0.3,9 
= 
0.895,  and  D  to deliver  a value  of W  =  0.861.  For  the 
emerging-market  economy,  I simply  pick  a  set  of  parameters  consistent 
with  it having  weaker  financial  institutions:  X = 
0.15,9 
= 
0.700,  and  D  to 
deliver  a value  of W  =  0.431. 
The  results  are  illustrated  in figure  1C1.1.  The  horizontal  line plots  the 
frictionless  interest  rate.  The  downward  sloping  line  portrays  the mar 
ginal  return  to capital  for  each  value  of  the  capital  stock.  Point  0 defines 
the  frictionless  equilibrium,  where  the  capital  stock  adjusts  to  the point 
where  the marginal  return  to capital  equals  the  frictionless  interest  rate. 
The  point  US  denotes  the  equilibrium  for  the  developed  economy.  The 
enforcement  constraint,  given  by  the vertical  line,  intersects  the demand 
curve  at  the point  where  the  capital  stock  is roughly  20 percent  below  its 68 Gertler 
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Figure  1C1.1 
frictionless  equilibrium  value.  Even  though  the marginal  return  to cap 
ital  exceeds  the  frictionless  equilibrium  interest  rate,  entrepreneurs  do 
not  have  sufficient  net worth  to obtain  additional  funds  to  move  beyond 
this  point. 
The  distortion  is  much  greater  for  the  emerging  market  economy:  the 
capital  stock  is about  45 percent  below  its  frictionless  equilibrium  value. 
The  premium  for  external  finance,  in  turn,  increases  to  roughly  7 per 
cent.  Though  this  example  is very  informal,  it  illustrates  how  in prin 
ciple  such  a model  could  potentially  explain  the  facts  presented  in 
Greenwood,  Sanchez,  and Wang  (2007). 
Again,  I stress  that  the qualitative  insights  from  this  example  are pres 
ent  in  Matsuyama's  analysis.  The  virtue  of  extending  the  analysis  in  the 
way  I have,  however,  is  that  one  can  begin  to  think  about  quantitative 
relevance.  Further,  while  I have  just presented  a  steady  state  analysis,  it 
is very  easy  to numerically  solve  for  the dynamics.  The  simple  structure 
of  the model,  further,  makes  the  results  easy  to  interpret. Comment  69 
One  important  caveat,  though,  is  the  potentially  sensitivity  of  the  fi 
nancial  contracts  to  aggregate  uncertainty.  There  is a  complex  issue  of 
how  financial  contracts  might  be  conditioned  on  aggregate  risk.  In  this 
instance,  the  dynamics  can  depend  heavily  on  borrowers'  ability  to  in 
sure  against  aggregate  risks  to  their  balance  sheets. 
4  Concluding  Remarks 
Overall,  I think  this  is an  excellent  survey  of  the  literature?definitely 
reading  list material.  The  next  step  in  the progress  of  this  literature  is  to 
develop  models  for quantitative  evaluation.  Hopefully,  five  years  from 
now  Kiminori  Matsuyama  will  survey  this  new  literature! 
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